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SHARING WATER: EVOLUTION, THREATS AND CHALLENGES
Water is currently on the political agenda of  most, if  not all, countries in the 
world. The reasons lay with the current water situation, which has become more 
acute with recent reports on the impacts of  climate change over water resources 
availability and the predictions of  water wars in the near future. This situation 
clearly begs the question of  what is humankind going to do or, more accurately, 
what can humankind do to survive this situation. And the immediate answer is, 
since there is so far no substitute for water, it must be shared between the haves 
and the have-nots, between the water-rich regions and the water-poor ones. But 
sharing the water, as a principle, is easier said than done. There are a multitude 
of  aspects influencing the decision to share water and the conditions of  that 
sharing. I will draw on two paradoxes identified by Boaventura de Sousa Santos1 
concerning the current theoretical framework in relation to reality. Although in a 
much more restricted topic, the current water debate, in my opinion, fits perfectly 
into his analysis. The first paradox, the finitude of  the infinite, captures clearly 
the change from the perception of  water abundance, in general terms, to one of  
water scarcity worldwide. And the second paradox, the need of  emergency asso-
ciated with the dynamics of  a civilizational transformation, which is everything 
but immediate, speaks to the challenges currently facing the water sector, as most 
other aspects of  human life.
These two paradoxes will guide my discussion of  the different contributions to 
the Dossier on “Water Sharing in Spain, Portugal and Morocco coordinated by 
Patrice Cressier and Fabienne Wateau2. The authors engage in different aspects 
of  water sharing that range from physical issues to political, social, economic and 
architectonic ones. Besides the overall theme of  “sharing water”, all of  them 
highlight different aspects of  this “sharing”, which implicitly, and sometimes even 
explicitly, draws out the current political dynamics underlying the process of  shar-
ing water. They all bring out, independently of  the time period they are analyz-
ing, pertinent sharing, or better said, governing principles of  water resources. 
Consequently, the two above identified paradoxes will be explained through the 
evolution of  water governance models3 and each author’s contributions will be 
1 B. de Sousa Santos, “A filosofia à venda, a douta ignorância e a aposta de Pascal”, Revista 
Crítica de Ciências Sociais (Coimbra), 80, May 2008: 11-43.
2 Le partage de l’eau (Espagne, Portugal, Maroc). El reparto del agua (España, Portugal, Marruecos), 
P. Cressier & F. Wateau (eds), Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez (Madrid), XXXVI (2), 2006, 383 p., 
ISBN : 84-95555-86-7.
3 J. Allan, “Water Resource Development and the Environment in the 20th Century: First 
the Taking, then the Putting Back.”, in J. Rodda & L. Ubertini (eds), The Basis of  Civilization – Water 
Science?, Wallingford (Great Britain), International Association of  Hydrological Sciences Press, 
2004: 135-149; K. Bakker, An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatizing Water in England and Wales, 
Oxford (Great Britain), Oxford University Press, 2003; P.D. Lopes, Water with Borders: Social Goods, 
the Market and Mobilization, Baltimore (USA), The Johns Hopkins University, PhD thesis, 2005.
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discussed according to their relation to different aspects of  those models, showing 
their relevance to the current water debate.
The end of  abundance
Although Quintela and Mascarenhas state that, in Roman times in Portugal, when 
it came to the “sharing of  responsibilities concerning investment and hydraulic 
equipment, [. . .] it [was] the private sphere that matter[ed]”4, water has actually 
been persistently excluded from the economic private sphere. For many, water is 
considered to be ‘God given’ or a ‘gift from nature’, just like air5, consequently 
not suitable to individual appropriation. Water sharing has evolved throughout the 
times, and even during the same period, several human settlements followed dif-
ferent sharing principles. Cressier shows us how, in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, 
during the Medieval Age, these principles of  sharing were “a direct reflection of  
the segmented organization of  the populations”6. He also highlights that sharing 
is in fact a specific aspect of  managing, and, in my opinion, governing.
Hydraulic State Governance Model
Besides this general perception of  water’s almost divinity, the natural and renewa-
ble character of  water created a perception of  abundance, which excluded its 
management from developing within a market framework. The combination of  
this primordial feeling and water’s perceived abundance precluded it from being 
treated as an economic good. As a result, and with the consolidation of  the 
modern state, and also as a means contributing to its legitimization7, in general 
terms, since the eighteenth century, water has been typically considered a social 
good by society, and kept under state’s jurisdiction. The state became not only 
the designated but also the default actor governing water resources.
The various industrial revolutions – steam power (18th-19th centuries), mass 
production and automation (20th century) – combined with the agricultural revo-
lutions – 18th century and the Green Revolution (1945 up to now) – dramatically 
increased the water demand for productive processes. The demographic revolution 
and urbanization further increased the pressure on fresh water resources. As a 
result, major infrastructures had to be built to divert water to new and growing 
urban centers. The acceleration and increased range of  these processes have 
characterized most of  the twentieth century, creating nowadays hydraulic societies. 
4 A. Quintela & J. Mascarenhas, “Barrages romains du Portugal. Types et fonctions”, Le 
partage de l’eau . . ., op. cit.: 30.
5 J. Sohnle, Le droit international des ressources en eau douce: solidarité contre souveraineté, Paris (France), 
La documentation française, 2002: 13.
6 P. Cressier, “Géométrie des réseaux et marqueurs des territoires. L’image du partage de 
l’eau dans le paysage médiéval (Espagne et Maroc)”, Le partage de l’eau . . ., op. cit.: 50.
7 L. Moral Ituarte & R. Silva Perez, “Grandes zonas regables y reparto del agua en España. 
El caso de la cuenca del Guadalquivir”, Le partage de l’eau . . ., op. cit.: 125-126.
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All of  the contributions show us different aspects of  the creation8, consolidation9 
and already questioning of  our hydraulic societies10.
Water has been, therefore, governed within a hydraulic state governance model. 
This is despite some of  the initial difficulties the state might have faced to con-
solidate its role. Cressier calls our attention to this aspect, illustrating how in the 
village of  Ag˙māt, still in medieval times, the fact that the State kept a share of  
the water was not consensually accepted. According to Cressier, “[t]his imposed 
sharing was never accepted except by force”11. With the consolidation of  the 
modern state, water was taken where needed, when needed. The overall aim was 
growth-oriented, focused on always increasing supply to face increasing demands 
and sustaining economic growth. Although in several parts of  the world water 
has always been a scarce resource, this supply-side approach in many regions 
reinforced the perception of  abundance. After all, water falls from the skies, and 
the planet’s hydraulic cycle, as far as we know it, is closed, which implies that the 
quantity of  water available in the world is always the same.
These considerations should be contextualized. Assessing water’s resources in 
the planet is not an easy task: water can be saline or fresh and exist in liquid, 
solid or gaseous state. However, the most cited numbers, by Igor Shiklomanov12, 
indicate that there is more than enough water in the world. The major problem 
is that, and according to Shiklomanov, 97.5% of  the planet’s water is saline and 
only 2.5% is actually fresh water. Furthermore, of  these 2.5% of  fresh water, 
68.7% constitutes ice and permanent snow cover in the Antarctic, the Arctic and 
different mountainous regions across the world. The next 29.9% is groundwater, 
which is, in several cases, difficult and/or expensive to access. This scenario leaves 
us with mere 0.26% of  the total mount of  fresh water in the planet available in 
lakes, reservoirs and river basins.
The second problem is that water is often in the wrong place, at the wrong 
time, with the wrong quality. It is not evenly distributed across space or time, nor 
does it follow an absolutely predictable cycle, denoting changes in the places and 
times of  rain fall. Consequently, the State, both as a means of  legitimization and 
of  participation in the modern progress, assumed the responsibility to take water 
to the right place, at the right time, with the right quality.
 8 A. Quintela & J. Mascarenhas, “Barrages romains . . .”, op. cit.: 17-38; P. Cressier, 
“Géométrie des réseaux . . ., op. cit.: 39-59; T. Madani, “Le partage de l’eau dans l’oasis de Figuig 
(Maroc oriental). Approche historique et archéologique”, Le partage de l’eau . . ., op. cit.: 61-82.
 9 T. Madani, “Le partage de l’eau . . .”, op. cit.: 61-82; G. Lemeunier, “Les maîtres de l’eau. 
Propriété et gestion hydraulique dans la Murcie moderne (v.1500-v.1800)”, Le partage de l’eau . . ., 
op. cit.: 83-106; F. Wateau, “Du préciput au partage égalitaire. Exemple portugais de transmission 
des droits d’eau de la fin du xixe siècle à nos jours (Melgaço, Alto Minho)”, Le partage de l’eau . . ., 
op. cit.: 107-124.
10 L. Moral Ituarte & R. Silva Perez, “Grandes zonas regables . . .”, op. cit.: 125-147; 
S. Clarimont, “Partager les eaux de l’Èbre. La presse aragonaise contre les projets de transfert”, 
Le partage de l’eau . . ., op. cit.: 149-170.
11 P. Cressier, “Géométrie des réseaux . . .”, op. cit.: 48.
12 I. Shiklomanov, “Appraisal and Assessment of  World Water Resources”, Water International, 
XV (1), 2000: 11-32.
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Although this governance model did not require water to be a free good (in 
the economic sense, i.e., a good that is not scarce), it actually created that illusion. 
Many countries did not charge for water; others actually subsidized water13; all 
did their best to build reservoirs and to guarantee a continuous water supply to 
urban centers and major businesses. This was reinforced by the allocation prin-
ciple that characterized this governance model: social equity. When people did 
have to pay for their water supply, charging was based on each citizen’s ability 
to pay. Water was not only abundant, but vital, consequently, the State picked up 
the tab of  those that could not afford to pay, when water was charged for. Water 
supply was considered a public service in the political-social sense of  the issue. 
In other words, although water, economically speaking, is a private good14, due 
to its vital role in human life and its non-substitutability, water has been managed 
as a social or political public good.
Consequently, the basic governing principles, domestically, were universal provi-
sion of  water and national solidarity. Everyone was entitled to water; no one could 
be excluded and if  more water was needed, it should be provided. This was 
defined politically and socially and not because water was an economic public 
good. It followed that for these two principles to be guaranteed and implemented, 
the best positioned actor was the State, or some other level of  public manage-
ment, who had the power and legitimacy to decide where and when infrastructures 
were built, finance those infrastructures and aim at an even distribution of  the 
resource within national boundaries. Clarimont discusses this solidarity from a 
riparian level to a national level in the Ebre river basin in Spain. And she states 
that all efforts were employed “to dominate nature, mobilize water, stock it, chan-
nel it in order to take it”15 where it was/is needed. Spain constitutes an interna-
tional reference of  a country where the hydraulic state governance model profoundly 
shaped the national physical scenery and determined the water policy of  avoiding 
each drop of  water from reaching the sea/ocean, since that was considered to be 
a wasted drop.
Within the hydraulic state governance model, the universal provision of  water 
was accompanied by a tendency to define water resources as public property. 
Water resources public ownership is currently enshrined in country’s national 
constitutions and/or legislations16. Several national constitutions define water, along 
13 L. Moral Ituarte & R. Silva Perez, “Grandes zonas regables . . .”, op cit.
14 An economic private good means its consumption is rival and excludable, i.e. one can 
physically prevent others from consuming water and one’s consumption diminishes the amount 
of  water available for others to consume. Whereas an economic public good means that a good’s 
consumption is not rival or excludable. The classical examples are domestic security or a light 
house, and this is independently of  the property rights regime associated with that good.
15 S. Clarimont, “Partager les eaux de l’Èbre . . .”, op. cit.: 152.
16 It should be noted that many countries, until the Second World War, did not have an 
explicit legal definition of  water property rights. Water either did not have a property rights 
system – res nullius – or was assumed to be under the general natural resources property rights 
system if  one existed. The reasons underlying this change are not the object of  this research, 
but the author believes that the confluence of  environmental movements and the unprecedented 
emergence of  numerous new democratic regimes created the conditions for new constitutions 
to include an explicit mention to water itself, and for older democratic regimes to enact legisla-
tion dedicated to natural resources and/or water.
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with national soil, subsoil and all its natural riches, as belonging to the State, the 
nation or the government. Water resources are therefore public property. Most 
countries have adopted this definition, albeit with some nuances concerning the 
locus of  property – federal state, states, provinces, regions, any other autonomous 
political entity, the people or nation – and the legal interpretation of  public 
property17. In the case of  civil law legal systems, water has been defined as pub-
lic or private. This has created significant constraints on the states’ attempt to 
efficiently manage water resources, due to the fact that “private water went with 
private land”, specially underground water. As a result, countries such as France, 
Spain and Italy, have, in the last quarter of  the twentieth century, enacted legis-
lative reforms to bring all water resources under state ownership and made their 
use subject to administrative grant18. Under the common law system, water has 
maintained the res communes status defined by the Romans. “There can be no 
private ownership right in the running water of  a stream, river or natural chan-
nel, as such water is regarded as transient and fugitive.”19
This tendency to define water as a public or common “thing” is not exclusive 
to the legal systems derived from ancient Rome. The Chinese, for instance, have 
applied a “community approach” to water resources and water resources manage-
ment. This approach has been confirmed by the 1988 Water Law, where water 
resources are defined as the property of  the state, the property of  the whole 
people (Article 9). Under the Soviet regime, and within the socialist framework, 
all waters were rather the exclusive property of  the Union of  Soviet Socialist 
Republics, therefore state property. In Muslim countries, the teachings of  Prophet 
Mohammed have heavily influenced water management principles. The Prophet 
declared that the earth’s resources should be shared, including water20. And just 
like fire and grass, water, he stated, was a free good21 and a common entitlement 
of  all Muslims22. The Prophet also prohibited the selling of  water. Islamic water 
17 Public property can be interpreted in one of  three ways: people’s or nation’s property, 
which cannot be subject to any form of  property; public property per se, which confers the state 
the right to manage water, but those rights cannot be disposed of; and private property of  the 
state, which allows the state to act as any private economic actor. Popov, D., “Consideration 
on Current Issues in Contemporary Water Law”, in Regional Conference on Water Law: Legal Aspects 
of  Sustainable Water Resources Management, Teslic (Republic of  Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), 2001.
18 D. Caponera, “Existing Systems of  Water Law in the World.”, Paper presented at the 
Regional Conference on Water Law: Legal Aspects of  Sustainable Water Resources Management, Teslic, 
Republic of  Servia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2001: 3.
19 Ibid. Although the United States have a common law system, and the res communes nature 
of  water has strongly influenced the Eastern states, in some Western states, a different principle 
has been developed: the prior appropriation principle – the first to claim and use the water is 
entitled to it.
20 F. Chatel, Prophet Mohammed: A Pionner of  the Environment, 2003, available from <www.
islamonline.net/english/Contemporary/2003/02/Article02.shtml> accessed February 14, 2005.
21 H. Shuval, “Sustainable Water Development under Conditions of  Scarcity: Israel as a 
Study Case”, in S. Marchisio, G. Tamburelli & L. Pecoraro (eds), Sustainable Development and 
Management of  Water Resources: A Legal Framework for the Mediterranean, Rome, Institute for Legal 
Studies on the International Community – CNR, Mediterranean Sustainable Development Law – 
Mesdel, 1999: 197.
22 Emwis, Palestine: Institutional Framework of  the Water Sector, Euro-Mediterranean Information 
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law recognizes, in addition, two important water rights: the right of  thirst and 
the right of  irrigation23.
Some of  the contributions being analyzed here do address this aspect either 
implicitly or explicitly. Quintela and Mascarenhas refer to the importance of  the 
private sector for water management and the necessary investments, although it 
is not clear if  these dynamics are associated to explicit property rights. Cressier, 
addresses this issue explicitly as he discusses water management in medieval times 
in the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula. He highlights the fact that “the exis-
tence of  complex sharing infrastructure is usually the sign of  an effective autonomy 
of  that water property”24. Madani also addresses this issue explicitly, but he does 
recognize that despite the private nature of  water rights in the Figuig oasis25, there 
was an “eternal right” to bathe, wash and domestic use26, which actually resembles 
the ‘right to thirst’ decreed by Prophet Mohammed. Lemeunier relates the union 
or division of  water and land rights to the level of  existing water scarcity. Where 
water is less scarce, water and land rights go hand-in-hand; but in water scarce 
regions, there is a tendency for water and land rights to be separated and for 
water rights to be sold, bought, donated, mortgages or even rented out27. Wateau, 
with her study on water rights transfers throughout generations in a Portuguese 
region, Melgaço, shows us how water and land went together until the abolish-
ment of  the morgadios28 in 1863. From then onwards, although not in a radical 
manner, there was the possibility of  separating land and water rights. Finally, 
Clarimont does not address water rights per se, but her discussion of  regional and 
national solidarity implicitly raises that issue. Riparian people did not really claim 
concrete property rights over the water, but they considered it ‘their’ water and 
believed they should have a saying in the decision-making process concerning the 
management and use of  that water.
Neo-liberal Market Governance Model
In the last quarter of  that century, the end of  abundance is most acute, with 
water’s renewability being put into question by advancements in scientific knowledge. 
Some sources of  water are not, after all, as renewable as previously thought. For 
example, it has been recently established that less than one per cent of  the Great 
Lakes’ water is annually renewed29. Also, many aquifers have not been able to 
System on the know-how in the Water sector, 2005, available from <www.emwis-ps.org/institutions.
htm> accessed February 14, 2005.
23 Ibid.
24 P. Cressier, “Géométrie des réseaux . . .”, op. cit.: 41.
25 T. Madani, “Le partage de l’eau dans l’oasis de Figuig . . .”, op. cit.: 77.
26 Ibid.: 78.
27 G. Lemeunier, “Les maîtres de l’eau . . .”, op. cit.: 85.
28 A morgadio is “the group of  goods, which cannot be sold or separated, attached to a noble 
title, transferred, with the title, to the oldest of  a family”; these goods cannot be sold, exchanged, 
rented, mortgaged or donated or even used to pay debts (F. Wateau, “Du préciput au partage 
égalitaire . . .”, op. cit.: 113).
29 International Joint Commission, Protection of  the Waters of  the Great Lakes – Final Report on 
the Governments of  Canada and the United States, Washington, D.C., Ottawa, 2000: 6. The Great 
Lakes hold around one fifth of  the world’s fresh water resources (Ibid.: 1).
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replenish due to the rate of  human extraction being higher than the natural rate 
of  replenishment, and, as a result, are on the verge of  depletion or extreme 
pollution30. In several regions of  the word, the rate of  human consumption has 
surpassed water’s natural replenishment rate, creating a shortage, which strengthens 
the claim that a global water crisis is in the making. The perception of  abundance 
has been dramatically changed: water has become to be perceived as a scarce 
resource.
This shift from perceiving water resources as abundant to realizing they were 
actually a scarce resource was accompanied by other market pressures towards 
the commodification of  water itself. From the 1970s onwards, the costs of  the 
hydraulic state governance model began to receive greater attention. A convergence 
of  different factors led to this situation. On the one hand, the identification of  a 
water crisis, due to its ‘found’ scarcity, along with an increase of  environmental 
public consciousness determined the need for significant investments to manage, 
improve, extend and guarantee a sustainable and efficient water supply. On the 
other hand, the traditional provider, the state, claimed (and still claims) it did 
(does) not have the funds to satisfy the current demands. And, simultaneously, the 
economic paradigm shift that took place in the 1970s consolidated in the 1980s. 
From a policy paradigm where government was part of  the solution, neo-liberal 
economics claimed government was part of  the problem. The neo-liberal economic 
paradigm has (convincingly) presented private enterprise as “one of  the most 
desirable methods of  allocating resources, goods, and services”31. This desirability 
follows from the belief  that “exclusive private property is thought to foster the 
well-being of  the community, giving its members a medium in which resources 
are used, conserved and exchanged to their greatest advantage”32. Consequently, 
the negotiation of  resource allocation should unfold under the auspices of  the 
market. And, as a result, the water sector suffered a marketization33 process. It 
comes as no surprise, then, that private economic actors became extremely inter-
ested in participating in such a vital and scarce resource’s exploitation and man-
agement, both domestically and internationally.
It is in this context that, in January 1992, the World Meteorological Organization 
convened the International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin. 
30 The rate of  extraction of  water is higher than the rate of  natural replenishment of  aqui-
fers. As the level of  water decreases, the probability of  pollution through infiltration and salini-
zation increase.
31 F. Trelease, “Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public 
Regulation”, Natural Resources Journal (University of  New Mexico School of  Law), V (1), May 
1965: 6.
32 C. Rose, “The Comedy of  the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property”, University of  Chicago Law Review, 53, 1986: 712.
33 Marketization, privatization and commodification are here considered as different processes, 
albeit related. Marketization is the process by which private actors are allowed to participate in 
a certain economic activity and prices are charged for the product in question. Privatization is 
the process by which an economic activity shifts into private hands. Commodification is the 
process by which something becomes a tradable good in the market. In my understanding, water 
privatization has never occurred. Water’s property and services have never permanently shifted 
into private hands.
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The outcome of  this conference is known as the Dublin Statement, which was 
commended to the world leaders participating at the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The Dublin Principles, as 
they are usually referred to, have become extraordinarily influential in water gov-
ernance. The first principle acknowledges the vulnerable and finite nature of  water 
resources, and recognizes its role in sustaining life, the environment and develop-
ment. The central role of  women and the need for a democratic and participatory 
management model are asserted in the second and third principles. But it is the 
fourth principle, which has been most dominant in debates on water governance, 
and strengthened certain practices.
“Principle No. 4 – Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should 
be recognized as an economic good
Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of  all human beings 
to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to 
recognize the economic value of  water has led to wasteful and environmentally dam-
aging uses of  the resource. Managing water as an economic good is an important 
way of  achieving efficient and equitable use, and of  encouraging conservation and 
protection of  water resources.”34
This single principle has been the banner for many initiatives and programs of  
action. I would like to highlight how Wateau also draws our attention to the role 
of  women in water rights transfers and how Quintela and Mascarenhas underline 
that in roman times in Portugal, they were already able to identify the “first signs 
of  a time where management, rentability and effectiveness of  the infrastructure 
of  water became the first priority of  concerns”35. The Dublin Principles are an 
acknowledgement of  existing practices in some parts of  the world, especially where 
water is scarce, but their range of  influence comprises the whole world.
These three developments – hydraulic state governance model increasing costs, 
economic paradigm shift, and the Dublin Principles – created the environment 
for a new water governance model to gain shape: a neo-liberal market one. The 
shift from a perception of  water abundance to one of  water scarcity and the 
economic shift from market failure to state failure changed the instrument settings 
for water governance. Moreover, the mechanism to achieve the overall goals of  
the governance regime changed from social equity guaranteed by the state to 
economic equity facilitated by the market. The Dublin Principles were fundamen-
tal for both changes. The water governance goals were also modified. During the 
hydraulic state governance model the overall goal was universal provision; whereas 
the neo-liberal market model seeks efficiency, above all. This change of  water 
governance model is basically a process of  marketization of  water resources.
Within this new policy paradigm, government entities began to search for ways 
to both financially discipline and improve efficiency in the water sector. The 
immediate consequences were two fold. Many governments decided to allow pri-
vate actors to participate in the water sector, expanding the market opportunities 
34 International Conference on Water and the Environment, The Dublin Statement on Water 
and Sustainable Development, World Meteorological Organization, 1992, available from <www.wmo.
ch/web/homs/documents/english/icwedece.html> accessed 10 February, 2005.
35 A. Quintela & J. Mascarenhas, “Barrages romains . . .”, op. cit.: 28.
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for private investment (private sector participation). This has directly questioned 
the public nature of  the water sector, i.e., water’s social status. In some cases, 
even water’s public ownership has been challenged. Water charges are the other 
prong of  the marketization process (commodification). Prices became the most 
preferred means to achieving efficiency, and allegedly sustainability. Water charges 
challenge the heart of  the public service notion, because they have the potential 
to exclude water users, in addition to minimizing wasteful water use. For example, 
at the end of  October 2004, “two dozen workers [sent by the Atlanta Department 
of  Watershed Management] began turning off  the water of  customers who were 
more than 30 days delinquent, estimated to be about a quarter of  the city’s active 
134,000 accounts”36. The Department was owed around $35 million and it intended 
to “shut off  about 400 to 500 delinquents a day until the backlog [was] elimi-
nated”37. Because there is potential for water services to be discontinued in case 
of  consumer nonpayment, and water is an essential resource for human survival, 
exclusion is an extremely important social and political issue.
Moral Ituarte and Silva Pérez address this issue explicitly when analyzing the 
governance of  the Spanish Guadalquivir river basin. They discuss the 1999 Spanish 
Water Law that embraces this neo-liberal market water governance model, by 
predicting the creation of  water markets and water banks. Their analysis is 
extremely updated and pertinent, since they also include the negative reactions to 
these new governance principles. They question this new legal framework, that in 
fact has not been implemented yet, highlighting how in draught times, some farm-
ers defend a “social sharing” of  water38. Furthermore, they conclude farmers do 
not have a market relation with water and are not comfortable with references to 
“selling water”39. Their article goes to the heart of  the current water debate.
The emergency of  a lifestyle transformation
The neo-liberal market governance model has triggered fierce and violent reactions 
all over the world. The contributions of  this thematic Dossier do not include two 
issues related to this water governance model that I find crucial when it comes 
to sharing water: the human right to water and the international sharing of  water. 
No water volume should aspire to exhaust the theme, and these contributions 
were clearly focused on domestic dynamics of  water sharing. Nevertheless, some 
of  the considerations presented are directly related to the existence of  a human 
right to water and indirectly connected to the international sharing of  this 
resource.
Both the hydraulic state and the neo-liberal market governance models strengthen 
and are made stronger by the current lifestyle model characterized by mass pro-
duction and consumption, where efficiency constitutes the crucial factor. This 
lifestyle has its origins in the dynamics presented and discussed by several of  the 
36 A. Hart, “Atlanta Shutting Off  Water as It Tries to Collect $35 Million Overdue”, New 
York Times, 3 November, 2004: 13.
37 Ibid.
38 L. Moral Ituarte & R. Silva Perez, “Grandes zonas regables . . .”, op. cit.: 142.
39 Ibid.
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articles revised here. The consolidation of  a modern state, the absolute value of  
modernization and economic growth, the unchallenged primacy of  capitalism need 
a water governance model based on efficiency, on economic growth and techno-
logical solutions to any water shortages that may occur.
Human Right to Water
The main result of  the marketization process is the perception that the state is 
withdrawing, and being replaced by the market. The notion that the state is 
retreating from the water sector has not only triggered opposition from interna-
tional organizations, such as the Association for a World Water Contract40, but 
has also met domestic social protest from both supporters of  a public water sys-
tem as well as anti-globalization and anti-free trade activists. In several countries, 
such as Argentina, Bolivia, The Philippines, Great Britain (England and Wales), 
Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Canada, citizens reacted against private sector partici-
pation, against water charges, and against what they understood as an abnegation 
of  the state’s obligations and responsibilities. They demand ‘the return of  the 
state’ and the removal of  private actors from the water sector. These demands 
have materialized in the form of  termination and suspension of  public-private 
contracts, revocation of  legislation passed under the neo-liberal market impulse, 
and new regulation to define water’s governance regime in a different direction 
from the market. The move for states to renegotiate with the markets the obliga-
tions and responsibilities in the water sector has also produced a backlash against 
several water multinational companies, which have seen their interests abroad 
threatened41.
The governmental responses have varied42. Some countries, such as Bolivia, 
after having redefined water as a commodity, have then explicitly re-redefined it 
as not being a commodity. Others, such as Canada, have attempted to resolve 
the tension through domestic negotiations and by making use of  legal and pro-
cedural possibilities in order to clarify water resources’ social nature. Canada 
managed to thwart projects of  international water trade through environmental 
legislation at both the federal and provincial levels. Others yet, such as Uruguay, 
have decided to democratize the discussion by holding a referendum43. Others have 
yet to address this issue.
40 In the original: Association pour le Contrat Mondial de l’Eau (ACME). 
41 For example, the water multinational Bechtel saw its contract for the Bolivian Cochabamba 
water utility annulled in 2000, after water charges increased dramatically, and the population 
reacted violently. In 2005, the Bolivian government succumbed once again in face of  major 
protests over the contract signed between the French water multinational Suez and the El Alto 
water utility in the La Paz region. The demands were for an expansion of  the water supply 
coverage and against the increase of  water charges.
42 For an in-depth analysis of  Bolivia, France and Canada see P. D. Lopes, Water with Borders: 
Social Goods, the Market and Mobilization, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University, PhD thesis, 
2005.
43 On 31 October 2004, “more than 60 percent [of  Uruguayans] came out in favour of  
introducing a constitutional clause stating that ‘water is a natural resources essential to life’ and 
that access to piped water and sanitation services are ‘fundamental human rights’ ” (R. Pierri, 
Uruguay: Referendum Gives Resounding ‘No’ to the Privatisation of  Water, Inter Press Service News 
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Anti-free trade and anti-globalization movements, as well as international water-
specific organizations, have also joined in the contestation against water marketi-
zation. They oppose the initiatives developed by the World Water Council, the 
Global Water Partnership, the United Nations (UN), and the water multinational 
companies. The water-specific members of  this group oppose the commodification 
of  water, endorsing water as a human right. They also endorse a participatory 
model for water management, as opposed to the emphasis on good governance 
conferred by the World Bank and most UN agencies.
Both articles by Moral Ituarte and Silva Pérez, and by Madani, refer to aspects 
associated to the notion of  a human right to water when they discuss the “social 
sharing of  water” and the “eternal rights to water”, respectively. Even if  it is not 
explicitly acknowledged, the human right to water is enshrined in the ancient 
principles of  water sharing as well as in the universal provision sought under the 
hydraulic state governance model. The neo-liberal market governance model 
undermines those customary practices, demanding economic rationality in water’s 
governance, in order to face scarcity. Although the human right to water would 
definitely place water governance back under state’s responsibilities, and some 
water consumption patterns might have to change accordingly, the odds for every-
thing remaining the same are very high. The UN Human Rights Declaration 
institutes the right to food, shelter, health, clothing, among others, and that has 
not prevented states from failing to guarantee those same rights or the market to 
determine most of  their allocation. The modern hydraulic society lifestyle will not 
change with the decree of  a human right to water.
International Sharing of  Water
The importance of  international sharing of  water is associated to the human right 
to water, but also to the occurrence of  violent conflicts. The domestic hydraulic 
state governance model has been accompanied, internationally, by a strong terri-
torial approach. The states have dealt with water internationally, insofar as the 
water resources were internationally shared. International water resources have 
been a prerogative of  states’ negotiations and, therefore, have been governed by 
international treaties among riparians. The guiding principles of  these treaties 
have evolved over time. There are, nevertheless, several principles which seem to 
have achieved early consensus. First, only riparian states, as far as no agreement 
to the contrary existed, have had any legal rights to use the waters of  a trans-
boundary body, such as a river, lake or aquifer. And second, downstream countries 
have been entitled to an equitable share of  transboundary waters. This principle 
actually entailed a sort of  ‘natural right’ to the lower riparian to a minimum quan-
tity of  water needed for its survival and development. Equitable utilization is the 
key element in this principle and restricted sovereignty is the international status 
applied. The natural right to water of  the downstream country strengthens the idea 
that even internationally water has constituted a basic right, i.e., a social good.
Agency, 2004, available from <www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=26097> accessed 18 August 
2005). The result of  the referendum also included the decision that “piped water will be supplied 
[. . .] ‘exclusively and directly by state-owned legal entities’, and concessions to private firms will 
be cancelled” (ibid.).
188 paula duarte lopes
The Dublin Principles led to several new international institutional initiatives, 
and the economic paradigm shift created new business opportunities. On the one 
hand, several developed countries followed the marketization trend and allowed 
private economic actors to participate in their water sectors. The same dynamics 
occurred in developing countries, but as a result of  conditionality by the World 
Bank44, the International Monetary Fund, bilateral investment agreements, and 
other development aid agencies. On the other hand, the implementation of  mar-
ket mechanisms and instruments, such as private sector participation and water 
charges, created an environment conducive to international bulk water45 trade. 
The ‘window of  opportunity’ was further widened with the claim that major 
international trade treaties actually already covered bulk water trade. The 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (Harmonized System)46 
is the official classification of  internationally traded goods for the World Trade 
Organization. According to those who defend bulk water trade, the Harmonized 
System already predicts bulk water as an internationally traded good, under the 
sub-heading “22 Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar”, specifically under
“2201.90.00.00 Waters, including natural or artificial mineral waters and aerated 
waters, not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter nor flavored; ice and 
snow.”47
It is within this ‘window of  opportunity’ that bulk water export projects emerged 
in Canada, Bolivia and France, as well as several others plans in other countries. 
These projects imply a fundamental challenge to riparians’ monopoly of  their 
waters, and also to their ‘natural right’ to sufficient water for survival, adopting 
the price mechanism for international water allocation.
Conflicts and Violence
The end of  abundance, the retreat of  the state, the creation of  non-riparian water 
rights, the commodification of  water, all contribute to reinforce the idea that the 
wars of  the twenty-first century will be over water. In fact, many have predicted 
that the current situation will result in water wars48. This prediction has been 
44 For example, the World Bank used private sector participation in Bolivian water utilities 
and the implementation and/or increase of  water charges as both a means of  pressure and 
explicit conditions of  aid. For a vivid account of  this dynamics see C. Crespo Flores, La guerra 
del agua de Cochabamba: Cinco lecciones para las luchas anti neoliberales en Bolivia, available from <www.
aguabolivia.org> accessed February 2, 2005; C. Crespo Flores, El Banco Mundial Sócio de Águas 
del Illimani: sus implicaciones y riesgos, available from <www.aguabolivia.org> accessed February 3, 
2005, and J. Schultz, “The Politics of  Water in Bolivia”, The Nation (web only), posted on 
January 28, 2005.
45 Water in bulk is transported by pipes, canals, tankers, floating bags. According to Canadian 
legislation, water trade is considered bulk when transported in containers bigger than 20-30 
liters.
46 The Harmonized System was established by the World Customs Organization (WCO). The 
system is used to classify goods traded internationally and came into force in 1988 for the WCO 
member countries (currently 166).
47 World Customs Organization, Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, 2005.
48 P. Annin, The Great Lakes Water Wars, Washington, D.C., Island Press, 2006; M. Villiers, 
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cited over and over again, after the former-Vice-President of  the World Bank, 
Ismail Serageldin, publicly stated that the wars of  the twenty-first century will be 
over water, as the ones from the twentieth century were over oil49. This argument 
became almost intuitively accepted. After all, water has all the characteristics to 
explain why people would choose violence to address a conflict of  interests concer-
ning water access and/or use. Water is non-substitutable. In some regions, water 
is scarce, affecting not only the economic survival of  those regions, but also the 
physical survival of  their population. Water resources are physically connected to 
territory, which automatically triggers issues of  sovereignty. In addition, 263 rivers, 
accounting for 60% of  the world’s water resources, cross political borders, invol-
ving 145 states, of  which 54 have at least 95% of  their territory within these 
international water basins, which are home to 40% of  the world’s population50.
Several researchers have worked on this topic, but the most renowned are 
probably Peter Gleick51, Aaron Wolf  52 and Thomas Homer-Dixon53. The former 
publishes a bi-annual water report on the world’s fresh water, including a water 
conflict chronology, including threats to use force when facing a water conflict. 
Although researching a broader dynamic – environmental scarcity – Thomas 
Homer-Dixon work also applies to water resources. This author argues that envi-
ronmental scarcity may result in or exacerbate existing violent situations: an increase 
in demand, a decrease in supply and/or an unequal distribution of  environmen-
tal resources contribute to environmental scarcity54. Thus, environmental scarcity, 
including water resources scarcity, can lead to endemic poverty, large scale migra-
tions, growing social tensions and, consequently, to a weakening of  social and 
political institutions. The author clarifies that the relation between environmental 
scarcity and violence is not direct, i.e., environmental scarcity is not a necessary 
nor even a sufficient condition to trigger organized armed violence. Environmental 
scarcity interacts with economic, social and political conditions that determine the 
peaceful or violent development of  the conflict in question. Although, Homer-
Dixon defends that most of  these violent conflicts, if  to occur, will take place 
within national boundaries, he acknowledges that these violent dynamics will most 
probably have international spill-over effects.
Water: the Fate of  our Most Precious Resource, New York, Mariner Books, 2001; D. Ward, Water Wars, 
New York, Penguin Group, 2003; T. Homer-Dixon & J. Blitt (eds), Ecoviolence: Links Among 
Environment, Population and Security, Lanham, Rowan & Liittlefield Publishers, 1998; A. Wolf, 
“ ‘Water Wars’ and Violence”, Princeton, Princeton University, 1999.
49 V. Shiva, Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit, Cambridge, South End Press, 2002.
50 A. Wolf, “ ‘Water Wars’ and Other Tales of  Hydromythology” in B. McDonald & D. Jehl 
(eds), Whose Water is It? The Unquenchable Thirst of  a Water-Hungry World, Washington D.C., National 
Geographic, 2003: 109-124.
51 P. Gleick, The World’s Water 1998-1999: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources, Washington, 
D.C., Island Press, 1998.
52 A. Wolf, Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database – International Freshwater Treaties Database, 
2005, available from <http://ocid.nacse.org/cgi-bin/qml> accessed February 9, 2005; A. Wolf, 
“‘Water Wars’ . . .”, op. cit.
53 A. Wolf, “‘Water Wars’ . . .”, op. cit.
54 T. Homer-Dixon & J. Blitt (eds), Ecoviolence . . ., op. cit.
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Aaron Wolf  deconstructs the prediction of  ‘water wars’, calling them a ‘tale of  
hydromythology’55. According to Wolf ’s findings, there has not been a water war 
since 2000 b.c., between the Sumerian city-states of  Lagash and Umma, by the 
river Tigris56. Aaron Wolf  does not deny the fact that water resources may have/
had a significant role in the evolution of  certain conflicts into violence, but he 
researched further to understand the reasons why water has not triggered regular 
wars and violent responses. His findings identified the institutional factor (inter-
national treaties and institutions) as decisive in addressing conflicts in a violent or 
peaceful manner. In other words, Aaron Wolf  and his team observed that in cases 
where water conflicts did not result in violence, institutions existed or had been 
created to regulate, manage, dilute and/or settle these conflicts57. Moreover, it was 
not just the institutional factor that statically showed relevance. Following a dynamic 
approach, the conclusions were that the institutions that were able to absorb and 
manage drastic changes constituted the crucial element determining the resort to 
peaceful means as opposed to violent ones, in order to address the conflict58.
Cressier does mention that water sharing “is not totally without violence”59, 
and he goes further to identify some probable causes, such as “climate degrada-
tion, arrival of  massive numbers of  new people or imposition of  a new political 
order”60. These factors match perfectly with the generic dynamics underlying 
violent conflicts identified by Homer-Dixon: decrease in supply, increase in demand 
and/or unequal distribution, respectively. Cressier also states that sharing does not 
necessarily implicate conflict61. I would like however to distinguish conflict from 
violent conflict62. As long as two people want the same thing, there will be conflict. 
Consequently, more often than not, water sharing implies conflict. However, it 
does not have to imply violent conflict, as Aaron Wolf  demonstrates there are 
more examples of  water conflicts being managed by peaceful means, through 
international negotiations and treaties, than by violent means.
Lasserre refers to the question of  adaptability, which leads me to my final com-
ments. Both Aaron Wolf  63 and Homer-Dixon64 discuss, in different ways, adapt-
ability. Wolf  identifies that violence depends not only on the existing international 
institutions to govern shared water, but also on those institutions’ adaptability to 
drastic changes. Homer-Dixon argues that each society’s ingenuity will determine 
their solution to these (and other) challenges. Lasserre refers both Homer-Dixon 
55 A. Wolf, “ ‘Water Wars’ . . .”, op. cit.
56 P. Gleick (ed.), The World’s Water 2006-2007: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources, 
Washington D.C., Island Press: 2006; A. Wolf, “ ‘Water Wars . . .’ ”, op. cit.
57 A. Wolf, “‘Water Wars’ . . .”, op. cit.
58 Ibid.: 118.
59 P. Cressier, “Géométrie des réseaux . . .”, op. cit.: 40.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 M. R. Freire & P. D. Lopes, “Rethinking Peace and Violence”, paper presented at the 49th 
International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco (USA), 26-29 March, 
2008.
63 A. Wolf, “ ‘Water Wars’ . . .”, op. cit.
64 T. Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap: Facing the Economic, Environmental, and Other Challenges of  
an Increasingly Complex and Unpredictable Future, Knopf, 2000.
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and Ohlsson, the latter with the concept of  ‘social adaptation capacity’65. What 
is left unclear is if  this adaptability is to keep the status quo or to challenge the 
existing lifestyle model. Even if  institutions, ingenuity and adaptability might 
prevent us from violently fighting over water, water scarcity will not just go away. 
This is because, on the one hand, water scarcity is a result of  nature’s distribu-
tion, but on the other hand, and arguably more important, it is a consequence 
of  policies over human settlements, land use, economic growth and human pat-
terns of  consumption (and production). Besides adaptability, there is a vital need 
for adapting our lifestyle to a new physical reality, and this requires ingenuity, but 
not of  a technological nature to guarantee our current lifestyle, rather of  a social 
and political nature to change our lifestyle into one more in tune with nature and 
with our responsibilities to future generations. The current development model 
needs to be abandoned and not adjusted, because the overall aim will not be 
altered with adjustments. Humans need to change their production and consump-
tion patterns and an integrated land and water usage planning needs to be adopted, 
including the expansion of  existing or creation of  new human settlements.
* * *
The contributions to this special number on sharing water are extremely pertinent 
and jointly address the main elements of  different water governance models. Their 
case studies illustrate in a very interesting and vivid way several of  the water 
dynamics states and communities are still currently facing. Although they never 
address the end of  abundance or the emergency of  a lifestyle transformation, 
their analyses identify some of  the factors that contribute to these considerations. 
The most important role of  this Dossier, in my opinion, is two-fold. On the one 
hand, these contributions show the pertinence of  water issues regardless of  time, 
space and culture. On the other hand, although most of  the cases are relatively 
close, in geographical terms, these contributions shows us not only the diversity 
of  governing rules but also the different perspectives water can be studied through. 
Finally, the overall title reflects the constant struggle and efforts to share water 
between countries, communities, individuals, which is inherent to human life as 
we know it. The end of  abundance exacerbates the vital need to sharing water 
and it is this sharing that begs the emergence of  a lifestyle transformation.
June 2008, Paula Duarte Lopes
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65 F. Lasserre, “Le partage de l’eau dans le monde : un enjeu majeur du xxie siècle”, Mélanges 
de la Casa de Velázquez (Madrid), XXXVI (2), 2006: 177.
